After a long call between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump and following just after the US-Ukranian meeting in Jeddah last week, the war in Ukraine appears to be in its final stages.
Both Moscow and Kiev appear to agree to Trump’s pursuit of peace and reconciliation, but details of their position regarding details are blurred.
Kiev agreed to Washington’s proposal to negotiate peace talks following an unconditional 30-day ceasefire. Freezing the conflict before beginning peace talks was not what Ukraine wanted, but it was carried by the prospect of losing more territory, infrastructure, human life and perhaps American support.
Russia has each agreed to suspend missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for 30 days, and has been discussing a full-scale ceasefire. Previously, Moscow expressed concern not only about logistics and guarantees to prevent violations, but also about what comes afterwards.
The attention is due to the fact that Russia has advantages on the battlefield, and is not too enthusiastic about losing the framework of reconciliation before it is set on stone. In any case, Russian officials have heard that after Trump Putin’s appeal, they are very cheerful about the prospect of a settlement.
If ceasefire negotiations move forward, the question that arises is whether there is a chance that he could get everything he wanted in February 2022 when Putin launched a brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The rough framework of realistically achievable peace is now clear to all sides. Moscow has repeatedly stated that the peace agreement was developed by Russian and Ukrainian delegations in the spring of 2022, but would ultimately follow the outline of the Istanbul agreement, which was ultimately abandoned by Ukraine under British and American pressure.
These agreements are the upper limit of military neutrality in Ukraine, the size of the military, and envisage measures to protect Russian speakers living in Ukraine.
After three years of war, Moscow now hopes that Kiev is aware of the losses of four Ukrainian regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Carson and Zapolizia. However, the Kremlin could leave the demand for Ukrainian maximalists to withdraw from vacant parts of these regions.
US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Voldymir Zelensky show that territorial talks now occupy Russia and include the fate of the Zaporidia nuclear power plant, which is pretty close to the forefront. If Russia became part of that conversation, it means that it no longer claims the vacant north of Zaporidia – and more, the unvailing territory of the other three regions.
The discussion about nuclear power plants is a good sign as it shows a shift towards realistically achievable concessions that the West and Ukraine can extract from Russia, in contrast to the completely unrealistic demands of NATO boots, in the guise of the “peacekeeping forces” that the UK and France are pushing.
The key to understanding Putin’s logic is to accept that he is not fighting for his territory. He saw the full invasion and assumed that two breakaway regions, Donetsk and Luhansk, would remain under formal Ukrainian control, now as punishment for Ukraine to derail the 2015-2016 Minsk agreement. Russia in these two regions, along with Kherson and Zaporizhia, was the punishment for Ukraine, who left the Istanbul agreement.
Nuclear power plants could be exchanged viable for other territories or for political concessions relating to the rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church with Russian speakers in Moscow, but what is unnegotiable for Putin is the NATO countries that maintain security infrastructure or influence over Ukrainian security groups.
The conflict, rooted in the Western decision to confront, rather than integrating, the newly emerging democratic Russia of the 1990s, is to draw a thick red line that the US-led West will not expand, at least until a conversation about Russia’s integration into the West is once again possible.
But for now, Putin argues not only about the neutrality of Ukraine, but also about the removal of what he calls “NATO infrastructure.”
He could also call for the westernization of Ukrainian security structures that have been strongly affiliated with the CIA and MI6, including the leading intelligence news director (HUR) and some directors of the Ukrainian Security Services (SBU).
Importantly, he advocates the revolution of Kiev and NATO at the promise of the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit. Ukraine promises to become a member of the alliance. That commitment imposed on European allies by US President George W. Bush led to a change in the structure of Russia’s foreign policy, leading to a conflict between Georgia and subsequently Ukraine.
Judging from the signals emanating from Trump’s administration, all of these goals can be achieved, at least by the United States itself, with the lifting of sanctions against Russia. The Kremlin shows that it can agree to $300 million of frozen assets in western Russia that could be used for postwar reconstruction in Ukraine. This money is already considered lost, and perhaps such a benevolent gesture will help correct relationships with our now highly hostile neighbors.
If he can get all of that, Putin will see his decision to become a war criminal by launching a brutal attack on Russia’s closest neighbor in justified social, ethnic, cultural and economic terms.
In addition to ensuring Ukraine neutrality and pushing NATO further from the Russian border, Putin also appears to be bound to achieve another goal: the restoration of the status of Russia’s superpower in the eyes of the whole world.
For Western leaders, failure to restrain Russia leads to delayed perceptions. The main nuclear power that can destroy humanity cannot be defeated militarily. They may consider the fact that Moscow can be very effectively affected by soft power.
Russia continues to depend on Europe culturally and economically, as ever. Whatever the community itself thinks about Russia, it continues to be considered part of the European Community. It creates more strategic opportunities to reduce the threat that the West emanates from Moscow, rather than engage in what Western officials now call “proxy wars” in Ukraine.
The views expressed in this article are the authors themselves and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.